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"China is a big country, inhabited by many Chinese." --Charles de Gaulle

Friday 6 April 2012

The Future of Sino-US History


One of the things I have found most interesting in spending time in China is comparing the different ways that people view China against that which I like to think I know. Now unfortunately everything I write here very well may be proven wrong over the coming years but I thought it might be beneficial for some to take a look at the rising conflict between the two largest powers in the world from the viewpoint of a Canadian in China. The topic of Sino-US relations has been one of interest since watching a video several months back about Fukuyama discussing the matter of world hegemony, and his current beliefs regarding his book The End of History. The title here is a play on words from his more recent article entitled The Future of History (kind of ironic, but okay) which does not call into attention the relationship between China and the United States but relates none the less.

The purpose for me writing this now is multi-fold, one of my assignments for our Contemporary Studies class is to interview Chinese from around China and find their thoughts on the matter. So having done this I had a groundwork for the common thought of any Chinese and then just this morning I came across an article written by Henry Kissinger which is to be the afterword in the next publication of his book On China. To ensure that as little of this as possible is simply me rambling, it be largely quotations from articles, thoughts from Chinese people and some of my own ideas simply drizzled on top. I warn you now, this post is the same length as a paper (without the editing, sorry) but it will be well worth your read.

The following excerpts from Kissinger’s article give a well rounded background to current relations;

“[Chinese] see the United States as a wounded superpower determined to thwart the rise of any challenger, of which China is the most credible. No matter how intensely China pursues cooperation, some Chinese argue, Washington's fixed objective will be to hem in a growing China by military deployment and treaty commitments, thus preventing it from playing its historic role as the Middle Kingdom.
In China, the United States would encounter an adversary skilled over the centuries in using prolonged conflict as a strategy and whose doctrine emphasizes the psychological exhaustion of the opponent. In an actual conflict, both sides possess the capabilities and the ingenuity to inflict catastrophic damage on each other. By the time any such hypothetical conflagration drew to a close, all participants would be left exhausted and debilitated. They would then be obliged to face anew the very task that confronts them today: the construction of an international order in which both countries are significant components.
The United States will, as it should, continue to make its views known on human rights issues and individual cases. And its day-to-day conduct will express its national preference for democratic principles. But a systematic project to transform China's institutions by diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions is likely to backfire and isolate the very liberals it is intended to assist.
The U.S.-Chinese relationship should not be considered as a zero-sum game, nor can the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China be assumed in itself to be an American strategic defeat.
The United States has few precedents in its national experience of relating to a country of comparable size, self-confidence, economic achievement, and international scope and yet with such a different culture and political system. Nor does history supply China with precedents for how to relate to a fellow great power with a permanent presence in Asia, a vision of universal ideals not geared toward Chinese conceptions, and alliances with several of China's neighbors. Prior to the United States, all countries establishing such a position did so as a prelude to an attempt to dominate China.
The key decision facing both Beijing and Washington is whether to move toward a genuine effort at cooperation or fall into a new version of historic patterns of international rivalry. Both countries have adopted the rhetoric of community. They have even established a high-level forum for it, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which meets twice a year. It has been productive on immediate issues, but it is still in the foothills of its ultimate assignment to produce a truly global economic and political order. And if a global order does not emerge in the economic field, barriers to progress on more emotional and less positive-sum issues, such as territory and security, may grow insurmountable.
The American debate, on both sides of the political divide, often describes China as a "rising power" that will need to "mature" and learn how to exercise responsibility on the world stage. China, however, sees itself not as a rising power but as a returning one, predominant in its region for two millennia and temporarily displaced by colonial exploiters taking advantage of Chinese domestic strife and decay. It views the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural, political, and military affairs not as an unnatural challenge to world order but rather as a return to normality.“
Kissinger, Henry A, Foreign Affairs; Mar/Apr2012, Vol. 91 Issue 2, p44-55, 12p

Forbes has recently published an article as well entitled bluntly “China Doesn’t Think the US is That Awesome”.

“The United States is no longer seen as “that awesome, nor is it trustworthy, and its example to the world and admonitions to China should therefore be much discounted,” Mr. Wang writes of the general view of China’s leadership.
Many Chinese political elites suspect that it is the United States that is “on the wrong side of history.”

In discussion with a group of law students in the ancient capital of Xi’an I was let into the mindset of the Chinese towards the United States. When asked what they thought about Americans they were really nervous at first and conversation stopped. After a little coaxing I got some very interesting answers; “I used to like American culture, but now I’m more rational”, “Americans look down on others”, “Americans don’t like China”. Being a Canadian these answers didn’t really surprise me; it is much of the same response you could get around the world. The latter two I have also witnessed from the Americans within the group although albeit not consciously and not immediately apparent. In later discussion with Americans they were quite appalled that people thought of them this way.

I also asked the question ‘Who is your favorite American President within the past 50 years and why?’ in order to hear some positive things about our neighbour to the south. Now the answer to this question was incredibly specific to China and it blew me away to hear it but it was well validated. The first name out of everyone’s mouth was Nixon. Nixon does not exactly have the best track record in the United States but one of the things he did well was initiate Ping Pong Diplomacy in the 70’s which paved the way to more positive relations between the new Peoples Republic of China and the United States of America.

Another answer I got that surprised me was Obama. At first I figured this may be the only other president they know (really, who reading this knows the current leader in China?) but again the answer came with a solid explanation that he is gentle, not looking for war and doesn’t over exert American influence in the east.

Chinese know much more about America and Americans that Americans know about China and while it may be brushed off because the United States is more powerful and influential I feel forced to ask for how much longer? China is the second largest economy and they have 1/6th of the world’s population. It is the fact that America seems to ignore China’s success and current position in the world that causes much of the friction. At the moment China owns more US debt than any other nation and with that it means they could destroy the world economy as we know it with a snap of the fingers. To borrow the quote from Kissinger, I have to position myself with the Chinese when they see “the United States as a wounded superpower determined to thwart the rise of any challenger, of which China is the most credible”.

The other argument that Americans have against China is the lack of democracy but after being here, talking with people, and learning about the system, China is much more democratic than it looks. You don’t have to vote for anyone in the party, although that means they know what they are doing. One constituency may have several party member running in which case you vote for the individual, not the party. The party answers only to the people, not to some assembly. After following the upcoming American elections it makes me laugh at democracy in the west, more time is spent parading potential leaders in front of a camera like a dog show than listening to the people and working for the common good. There are still flaws in the Chinese system, don’t get me wrong, I don’t think it’s perfect but on the scale of good governance I have to believe that China is still on the uphill while the west is rolling down the other side. Hopefully this highlights the current but what about the future?

Fukuyama’s article “The Future of History” referenced at the top of the page does away with the current model of countries and looks towards what democracy and nations will look like down the road.

 “Imagine, for a moment, an obscure scribbler today in a garret somewhere trying to outline an ideology of the future that could provide a realistic path toward a world with healthy middle-class societies and robust democracies. What would that ideology look like?
It would have to have at least two components, political and economic. Politically, the new ideology would need to reassert the supremacy of democratic politics over economics and legitimate anew government as an expression of the public interest…Economically, the ideology could not begin with a denunciation of capitalism as such, as if old-fashioned socialism were still a viable alternative. It is more the variety of capitalism that is at stake and the degree to which governments should help societies adjust to change.
Elites in all societies use their superior access to the political system to protect their interests, absent a countervailing democratic mobilization to rectify the situation. American elites are no exception to the rule.
That mobilization will not happen, however, as long as the middle classes of the developed world remain enthralled by the narrative of the past generation: that their interests will be best served by ever-freer markets and smaller states. The alternative narrative is out there, waiting to be born.”
Fukuyama, Francis, Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1, p53-61, 9p

After reading that I have to say, it sounds like China is much closer to the democracy of the future than the United States; “Americans may today benefit from cheap cell phones, inexpensive clothing, and Facebook, but they increasingly cannot afford their own homes, or health insurance, or comfortable pensions when they retire”.

If you have made it this far I applaud you and I hope you have learned even just a little about China-US Relations and if you have any comments or questions at all please let me know as I also desire to keep looking at it and would love a fresh point of view. (If you want to have a dialogue, feel free to email me at colin_buschman@hotmail.com)

PS. Just so you now know, the current leader is Hu Jintao with power transferring to the fifth generation of leadership Xi Jinping over the next coming months.

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